(#140) Added parameters to control /etc/security/faillock.conf #82
Workflow file for this run
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| # Push/Trigger a GitLab CI pipeline for the PR HEAD, **ONLY IF:** | |
| # | |
| # 1. The .gitlab-ci.yaml file exists and validates | |
| # 2. The PR submitter has write access to the target repository. | |
| # | |
| # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| # | |
| # NOTICE: **This file is maintained with puppetsync** | |
| # | |
| # This file is updated automatically as part of a puppet module baseline. | |
| # | |
| # The next baseline sync will overwrite any local changes to this file! | |
| # | |
| # ============================================================================== | |
| # | |
| # GitHub Action Secrets variables available for this pipeline: | |
| # | |
| # GitHub Secret variable Type Notes | |
| # ------------------------ -------- ---------------------------------------- | |
| # GITLAB_API_PRIVATE_TOKEN Secure Should have `api` scope | |
| # GITLAB_API_URL Optional | |
| # | |
| # The secure vars will be filtered in GitHub Actions log output, and aren't | |
| # provided to untrusted builds (i.e, triggered by PR from another repository) | |
| # | |
| # !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! | |
| # WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING | |
| # !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!V!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! | |
| # | |
| # DO NOT MODIFY this workflow, unless you **REALLY** know what you are doing. | |
| # | |
| # This workflow bypasses some of the built-in protections of the | |
| # `pull_request_target` event by explicitly checking out the PR's **HEAD**. | |
| # Without being VERY CAREFUL, this could easily allow a malcious PR | |
| # contributor the chance to access secrets or a GITHUB_TOKEN with write scope!! | |
| # | |
| # The jobs in this workflow are designed to handle this safely -- but DO NOT | |
| # assume any alterations will also be safe. | |
| # | |
| # For general information, see: | |
| # | |
| # https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/events-that-trigger-workflows#pull_request_target | |
| # | |
| # For further information, or if ANY of this seems confusing or unecessary: | |
| # | |
| # ASK FOR ASSISTANCE **BEFORE** ATTEMPTING TO MODIFY THIS WORKFLOW. | |
| # | |
| # !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! | |
| # WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING | |
| # !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!V!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! | |
| # | |
| # https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/events-that-trigger-workflows | |
| # | |
| --- | |
| name: PR GLCI | |
| on: | |
| pull_request_target: | |
| types: [opened, reopened, synchronize] | |
| jobs: | |
| # The ONLY reason we can validate the PR HEAD's content safely here is that | |
| # we restrict ourselves to sending data elsewhere. | |
| glci-syntax: | |
| name: '.gitlab-ci.yml Syntax' | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| outputs: | |
| valid: ${{ steps.validate-glci-file.outputs.valid }} | |
| steps: | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@v3 | |
| with: | |
| repository: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }} | |
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} | |
| - name: 'Validate GLCI file syntax' | |
| id: validate-glci-file | |
| uses: simp/github-action-gitlab-ci-syntax-check@main | |
| with: | |
| gitlab_api_private_token: ${{ secrets.GITLAB_API_PRIVATE_TOKEN }} | |
| gitlab_api_url: ${{ secrets.GITLAB_API_URL }} # https://gitlab.com/api/v4 | |
| contributor-permissions: | |
| name: 'PR contributor check' | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| outputs: | |
| permitted: ${{ steps.user-repo-permissions.outputs.permitted }} | |
| steps: | |
| - uses: actions/github-script@v6 | |
| id: user-repo-permissions | |
| with: | |
| github-token: ${{secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN}} | |
| # See: | |
| # - https://octokit.github.io/rest.js/ | |
| # - https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/rest/reference/repos#get-repository-permissions-for-a-user | |
| script: | | |
| const project_permission = await github.request('GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/collaborators/{username}/permission', { | |
| headers: { | |
| accept: 'application/vnd.github.v3+json' | |
| }, | |
| owner: context.repo.owner, | |
| repo: context.repo.repo, | |
| username: context.payload.sender.login, | |
| }) | |
| const has_write_access = perm_lvl => (perm_lvl == "admin" || perm_lvl == "write" ) | |
| const write_access_desc = perm_bool => (perm_bool ? "PERMISSION OK" : "PERMISSION DENIED" ) | |
| if( has_write_access(project_permission.data.permission )){ | |
| core.setOutput( 'permitted', 'true' ) | |
| } else { | |
| core.setOutput( 'permitted', 'false' ) | |
| console.log(`::error ::payload user '${context.payload.sender.login}' does not have CI trigger permission for '${context.repository}; not triggering external CI'`) | |
| } | |
| console.log(`== payload user '${context.payload.sender.login}' CI trigger permission for '${context.repo.owner}': ${write_access_desc(has_write_access(project_permission.data.permission))}`) | |
| trigger-when-user-has-repo-permissions: | |
| name: 'Trigger CI [trusted users only]' | |
| needs: [ glci-syntax, contributor-permissions ] | |
| # This conditional provides an extra safety control, in case the workflow's | |
| # `on` section is inadventently modified without considering the security | |
| # implications. | |
| # | |
| # This job will ONLY trigger on: | |
| # | |
| # - [x] pull_request_target event: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' | |
| # AND: | |
| # - [x] Newly-opened PRs: github.event.action == 'opened' | |
| # - [x] Re-opened PRs: github.event.action == 'reopened' | |
| # - [x] Commits are added to PR: github.event.action == 'synchronize' | |
| # AND: | |
| # - [x] .gitlab-ci.yml exists/ok: needs.glci-syntax.outputs.valid == 'true' | |
| # | |
| # [Not implemented] It should NEVER trigger on: | |
| # | |
| # - [ ] Merged PRs: github.event.pull_request.merged == 'false' | |
| # - (the downstream GitLab mirror will take care of that) | |
| # - Not implemented: For some reason, this conditional always fails | |
| # - Unnecessary if on>pull_request_target>types doesn't include 'closed' | |
| if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' && ( github.event.action == 'opened' || github.event.action == 'reopened' || github.event.action == 'synchronize' ) && github.event.pull_request.merged != 'true' && needs.glci-syntax.outputs.valid == 'true' && needs.contributor-permissions.outputs.permitted == 'true' | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| steps: | |
| # Things we'd like to do: | |
| # - [ ] if there's no GitLab mirror, make one | |
| # - [ ] if there's no GitLab <-> GitHub integration, make one | |
| # - [ ] if there's no PR check on the main GitHub branch, make one (?) | |
| # - [x] Cancel any GLCI pipelines already pending/running for this branch | |
| # - "created|waiting_for_resource|preparing|pending|running" | |
| # - Exception: don't cancel existing pipeline for our own commit | |
| # - [x] if PR: force-push branch to GitLab | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@v3 | |
| if: needs.contributor-permissions.outputs.permitted == 'true' | |
| with: | |
| clean: true | |
| fetch-depth: 0 # Need full checkout to push to gitlab mirror | |
| repository: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }} | |
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} | |
| - name: Trigger CI when user has Repo Permissions | |
| if: needs.contributor-permissions.outputs.permitted == 'true' | |
| uses: simp/github-action-gitlab-ci-pipeline-trigger@v1 | |
| with: | |
| git_branch: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} # TODO check for/avoid protected branches? | |
| git_hashref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} | |
| gitlab_api_private_token: ${{ secrets.GITLAB_API_PRIVATE_TOKEN }} | |
| gitlab_group: ${{ github.event.organization.login }} | |
| github_repository: ${{ github.repository }} | |
| github_repository_owner: ${{ github.repository_owner }} | |
| - name: When user does NOT have Repo Permissions | |
| if: needs.contributor-permissions.outputs.permitted == 'false' | |
| continue-on-error: true | |
| run: | | |
| echo "Ending gracefully; Contributor $GITHUB_ACTOR does not have permission to trigger CI" | |
| false | |
| ### examine_contexts: | |
| ### name: 'Examine Context contents' | |
| ### if: always() | |
| ### runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| ### needs: [ glci-syntax, contributor-permissions ] | |
| ### steps: | |
| ### - name: Dump contexts | |
| ### env: | |
| ### GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJson(github) }} | |
| ### run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT" | |
| ### - name: Dump needs context | |
| ### env: | |
| ### ENV_CONTEXT: ${{ toJson(needs) }} | |
| ### run: echo "$ENV_CONTEXT" | |
| ### - name: Dump env vars | |
| ### run: env | sort | |