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[Tokenomics] Initial stake weighted rewards implementation #825
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If I understand correctly, the weight TLM is being enforced on the claimable amount of coins
The last TLM is not faithful to the current stake weight multiplication, since in Morse is not only the Given that the base coins are only a fraction of the total rewards today, as it is this algorithm will mint much lower rewards to stake weighted nodes. |
@RawthiL thanks for taking a look. You are understanding it right.
Great clarification. Given that, SWR would not be faithful to Morse without enforcing it to be run last. Which breaks the TLM assumption of being order free if we want to treat is as a TLM. To multiply both MEB and GMR, SWR would need to run as a "post-processing" module, which makes it a non-TLM. Whether we use the inflationary variant @Olshansk proposed or the Morse one, it has to run last if we want to multiply all the rewards. |
Yes, that's the problem with this module. Just to leave record of view on SWM: Shannon nodes are lean by default, the cost of a node is no longer an issue and hence the SWM has no place. The problem it solves does not exist in Shannon (neither in Morse today). If we include this we are importing obsolete code into the new version of the network. Going from Morse to Shannon will require re-staking of all nodes, so we can break-up or fusion nodes stakes arbitrary during the transition. cc @Olshansk |
@RawthiL Thank you for the reminder that SWM came BEFORE lean nodes in Morse. @red-0ne Let's close this PR. Apologize for the redundant work... @RawthiL What this means is that the minimum stake per supplier will be the expected value staked per supplier. cc @bryanchriswhite for visibility. Suppliers will be able to stake more but there is no upside to doing so (similar to ETH validators). I realize we can play around with other ponzinoics here, but would rather leave that convo to post-mainnet. @RawthiL The only reason this matters (but there's no actionable for us) is because once we figure out the numbers for probabilistic proofs, it'll be similar to:
👍 if this makes sense @RawthiL @red-0ne |
@Olshansk, this was an invaluable deep dive in which we learned a lot with @bryanchriswhite. It led us to lean towards a "demand driven" staking mechanism, where:
i.e. If a We'll present a doc when time permits. |
@red-0ne Can you create a ticket for this (w/ a screenshot of your prior message). Personally, I think we can make slashing just be the entire supplier's stake because that's what probabilistic proofs assumes. It is also much easier to go to mainnet with. We can always iterate later. |
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Summary
StakeWeightedRewards
TLM use the "base reward" (actualSettlementCoin
) to adjust whateverBurnEqualsMint
minted.This is missing:
Issue
Type of change
Select one or more from the following:
consensus-breaking
label if so. See [Infra] Automatically add theconsensus-breaking
label #791 for detailsTesting
make go_develop_and_test
make test_e2e
devnet-test-e2e
label to the PR.Sanity Checklist