This project contains:
- Custom BloodHound Queries we often use to see important things in BloodHound
- Custom Neo4j Queries we use to extract data directly from the Neo4j browser console
- BloodHoundLoader script, which allows to make batch modifications to the BloodHound data
Here is a simple description of the BloodHound queries in customqueries.json.
On Linux, you can simply install the queries using this curl command:
$ curl -o "~/.config/bloodhound/customqueries.json" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CompassSecurity/BloodHoundQueries/master/customqueries.json"
On Windows, you can simply install the queries using this PowerShell command:
PS C:\> Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CompassSecurity/BloodHoundQueries/master/customqueries.json" -OutFile "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\bloodhound\customqueries.json"
Return all domains.
Return members of the Domain Controllers group for a chosen domain.
Return all targets that have been marked as High Value.
Return all the computers without LAPS for a chosen domain.
Return all the principals that have been marked as Owned.
Return all principals whose name or description contains keywords like "admin" or "secret" for a chosen domain.
Return all the users with a password in the AD object for a chosen domain. The password can then be read in the Node Info.
Return all the users with the string "pass" in their description for a chosen domain. This might indicate a password or password hint.
Return all the users with the password not being required and that can therefore be blank for a chosen domain.
Return all the users with the password never expiring for a chosen domain.
Return all the users that have the same name and are in different Domains, the password could be reused.
Return all principals in the "Protected Users" group for a chosen domain. This group protects users against several attacks.
Return all relationships where one object is admin to another for a chosen domain.
Return all members of the "Administrators" group for a chosen domain.
Return all the computers members of "Administrators" for a chosen domain.
This can be exploited by triggering an SMB connection from this computer to the attacker's computer and relaying it to any computer in the domain in order to gain local administrative privileges. The reason is that Domain Admins are local administrators of every computer in the domain.
Requirements:
- Domain account
- Print spooler service on the source computer active, or another way of triggering an outgoing connection
- No SMB signing on the target computer or a working RPC attack
- No firewall blocking the connection from the source computer to the attacker
- No firewall blocking SMB/RPC from the attacker to the target computer
Return all the computers for a chosen domain that are local administrators to another computer.
This can be exploited by triggering an SMB connection from the first computer to the attacker's computer and relaying it to the other computer in order to gain local administrative privileges.
Requirements:
- Domain account
- Print spooler service on the source computer active, or another way of triggering an outgoing connection
- No SMB signing on the target computer or a working RPC attack
- No firewall blocking the connection from the source computer to the attacker
- No firewall blocking SMB/RPC from the attacker to the target computer
Return sessions of members of the Administrators group on computers which are not member of the Domain Controllers group for a chosen domain.
These session should be investigated as they break the tiering principle and could lead to privilege escalation.
Return principals allowed to perform DCSync and not already being Administrators for a chosen domain.
Return principals for a chosen domain that don't require pre-authentication. These can be AS-REP-roasted.
Return principals for a chosen domain that have an SPN. These can be kerberoasted.
Return principals in the Administrators group of a chosen domain that have an SPN. These can be kerberoasted.
Return principals for a chosen domain allowed to perform Constrained Delegation with their target.
Return computers for a chosen domain allowed to perform Constrained Delegation with their target.
Return principals for a chosen domain allowed to perform Unconstrained Delegation (source: https://twitter.com/_wald0/status/1108660095800479744).
Similar to the pre-built query "Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems", except that the Domain Controllers and the Administrators are excluded.
In order to exploit it, use the Unconstrained Delegation with the corresponding account:
- https://dirkjanm.io/krbrelayx-unconstrained-delegation-abuse-toolkit/
- https://blog.netspi.com/machineaccountquota-is-useful-sometimes/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667
- https://blog.redxorblue.com/2019/12/no-shells-required-using-impacket-to.html
Find GPOs with interesting keywords (password, antivirus, etc.).
Find principals for a chosen domain with permissions (ACLs) on GPOs, excluding members of the Administrators group.
Return GenericAll rights (also group-delegated) of principals excluding Administrators. This allows reading the LAPS password ms-Mcs-AdmPwd.
Return GenericAll rights (also group-delegated) of all owned principals. This allows reading the LAPS password ms-Mcs-AdmPwd.
Return all the users with an ACL to a computer, except the ones marked as High Value.
In order to exploit it, use the Resource-Based Constrained Delegation with the corresponding account:
- https://posts.specterops.io/a-case-study-in-wagging-the-dog-computer-takeover-2bcb7f94c783
- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
- https://dirkjanm.io/worst-of-both-worlds-ntlm-relaying-and-kerberos-delegation/
Return Outbound Object Control (also group-delegated) of all owned principals.
Find groups under Domain Users which have dangerous (ACLs) privileges over other objects.
Similar to the pre-built query "Find Dangerous Rights for Domain Users Groups", except that it includes groups nested under Domain Users.
Mark all the principals with DCSync rights as High Value.
Mark all the principals with Unconstrained Delegation privileges as High Value.
Mark all the principals that are local administrators or that can reset passwords as High Value.
Mark all the principals with certain privileges on computers as High Value.
Mark all the principals with certain privileges on the Cert Publishers group as High Value.
Mark all the members of High Value groups as High Value.
Unmark the inactive users (disabled) and computers (disabled or no login during the last 6 months) as High Value.
Return all the shortest paths to the Domain, including the Computers.
Similar to the pre-built query "Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admins", except that it includes not only the users but the computers as start nodes and targets the Domain instead of Domain Admins.
Return all the shortest paths to computers without LAPS installed.
Handy in environments where LAPS is deployed on almost every computer in order to find the ones without it, attack them and possibly reuse local administrator passwords.
Return all the shortest paths from the kerberoastable users to computers.
Similar to the pre-built query "Shortest Paths from Kerberoastable Users", except that the user doesn't have to be selected individually.
Return all the shortest paths from the kerberoastable users to targets marked as High Value.
Return all the shortest paths from any principal marked as Owned to anything (users, computers, groups...).
Similar to the pre-built query "Shortest Path from Owned Principals", except that the user doesn't have to be selected individually and displays the paths to everything, not every to computers.
Return all the shortest paths from any principal marked as Owned to the Domain.
Return all the shortest paths from any principal marked as Owned to targets marked as High Value.
Return all the shortest paths from any principal marked as Owned to computers without LAPS.
Handy in environments where LAPS is deployed on almost every computer in order to find the ones without it, attack them and possibly reuse local administrator passwords.
Return all the shortest paths from computers without SMB signing to the Domain.
Handy in environments where SMB signing is enforced on almost every computer in order to find the ones without it, attack them and possibly reuse local administrator passwords.
The computers without signing have to be imported manually with BloodHoundLoader.py.
Return all the shortest paths from computers without SMB signing to targets marked as High Value.
Handy in environments where SMB signing is enforced on almost every computer in order to target them specifically.
The computers without signing have to be imported manually with BloodHoundLoader.py.
Return all the shortest paths from the Domain Users and Domain Computers to anything (users, computers, groups...).
The AD CS queries come from ly4k and are to be used in conjunction with Certipy.
The Azure queries come from haus3c and are to be used in conjuction with AzureHound
The following queries are to be used in Neo4j Browser directly (by default http://localhost:7474/browser/).
Show how many computers have LAPS enabled and disabled:
MATCH (c:Computer) RETURN c.haslaps, COUNT(*)
In certain cases, the groups being local administrators are added locally on the computer and not deployed via GPO. In that case, the "AdminTo" edges are not visible in BloodHound.
If the naming convention allows it, it is possible to find which group has access to which computer and to add the corresponding edges.
First of all, search for all the groups containing the name of a computer and lists the mapping:
MATCH (g:Group), (c:Computer) WHERE g.name =~ (".*" + replace(c.name, ("." + c.domain), (".*" + "@" + c.domain))) RETURN g.name AS Group, c.name AS Computer
If result is similar to this, you might be lucky and be able to add several new edges to your BloodHound:
Group Computer
[email protected] COMPUTER1.DOMAIN.LOCAL
[email protected] COMPUTER2.DOMAIN.LOCAL
[email protected] COMPUTER3.DOMAIN.LOCAL
In order to create the new the edges according to the naming convention, you can use the following query where you have to replace the "PREFIX_" and "_SUFFIX" according to the results above:
MATCH (g:Group), (c:Computer) WHERE g.name =~ ("PREFIX_" + replace(c.name, ("." + c.domain), ("_SUFFIX" + "@" + c.domain))) CREATE (g)-[r:AdminTo]->(c) RETURN g.name AS Group, c.name AS Computer
BloodHoundLoader.py is a tool to set the value of an attribute in BloodHound (e.g. high value, owned...) for all the items contained in a file.
It should be used with Python 3 and with the Neo4j module installed since it is run directly against the Neo4j database:
pip3 install --upgrade neo4j
Set all the computers in the file "high_value.txt" to high value targets:
python3 BloodHoundLoader.py --dburi bolt://localhost:7687 --dbuser neo4j --dbpassword BloodHound --mode h high_value.txt
Set all the computers in the file "owned.txt" to owned principals:
python3 BloodHoundLoader.py --mode o owned.txt
Set all the computers in the file "no_smb_signing.txt" to "hassigning = false", in order to use them with the queries "All Shortest Paths from no Signing to *":
python3 BloodHoundLoader.py --mode s no_smb_signing.txt
The names of users and computers in the text file should correspond to the text shown on the GUI, e.g.:
DC.ACME.COM
COMPUTER.ACME.COM
[email protected]
Create new AdminTo edges based on the tuples in the file "adminto.txt":
python3 BloodHoundLoader.py --edge AdminTo adminto.txt
The names tuples in the text file must be comma separated and ordered (source,destination):
DOMAIN [email protected],DC.ACME.COM
SERVER [email protected],COMPUTER1.ACME.COM
[email protected],RIDDLE.ACME.COM
Full help:
python3 BloodHoundLoader.py --help
usage: BloodHoundLoader.py [-h] [--dburi DATABASEURI] [--dbuser DATABASEUSER] [--dbpassword DATABASEPASSWORD] (-m {h,o,s} | -o OPERATION) [-c COMMENT] [-v] filePaths [filePaths ...]
BloodHoundLoader, tool to set attributes in BloodHound for all the items contained in files
positional arguments:
filePaths Paths of files the to import
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--dburi DATABASEURI Database URI (default: bolt://localhost:7687)
--dbuser DATABASEUSER
Database user (default: neo4j)
--dbpassword DATABASEPASSWORD
Database password (default: BloodHound)
-m {h,o,s}, --mode {h,o,s}
Mode, h = set to high value, o = set to owned, s = set to no SMB signing, u = umark as owned (default: None)
-o OPERATION, --operation OPERATION
Operation to perform if the mode is not set, for instance "highvalue = true" (default: None)
-e EDGE, --edge EDGE
Create the provided edge, file must contain exactly 2 nodes per line, comma separated (default: None)
-c COMMENT, --comment COMMENT
Comment for the log (default: )
-v, --verbose Verbose mode (default: False)
BloodHound pre-built queries:
Introduction to Cypher query language:
Cypher cheat sheet:
Cypher queries collection: