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verifier.rs
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verifier.rs
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use super::helpers::attr_common_view;
use super::helpers::new_nonce;
use super::types::Presentation;
use super::types::PresentationRequest;
use super::types::RevocationRegistryDefinition;
use super::types::RevocationStatusList;
use crate::data_types::cred_def::CredentialDefinition;
use crate::data_types::cred_def::CredentialDefinitionId;
use crate::data_types::issuer_id::IssuerId;
use crate::data_types::nonce::Nonce;
use crate::data_types::pres_request::AttributeInfo;
use crate::data_types::pres_request::NonRevokedInterval;
use crate::data_types::pres_request::PresentationRequestPayload;
use crate::data_types::presentation::{Identifier, RequestedProof, RevealedAttributeInfo};
use crate::data_types::rev_reg_def::RevocationRegistryDefinitionId;
use crate::data_types::schema::Schema;
use crate::data_types::schema::SchemaId;
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::services::helpers::build_credential_schema;
use crate::services::helpers::build_non_credential_schema;
use crate::services::helpers::build_sub_proof_request;
use crate::services::helpers::get_predicates_for_credential;
use crate::services::helpers::get_revealed_attributes_for_credential;
use crate::ursa::cl::verifier::Verifier as CryptoVerifier;
use crate::ursa::cl::CredentialPublicKey;
use crate::ursa::cl::RevocationRegistry as CryptoRevocationRegistry;
use crate::utils::query::Query;
use crate::utils::validation::LEGACY_DID_IDENTIFIER;
use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use regex::Regex;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Filter {
schema_id: SchemaId,
schema_issuer_id: IssuerId,
schema_name: String,
schema_version: String,
issuer_id: IssuerId,
cred_def_id: CredentialDefinitionId,
}
static INTERNAL_TAG_MATCHER: Lazy<Regex> =
Lazy::new(|| Regex::new("^attr::([^:]+)::(value|marker)$").unwrap());
/// Verify an incoming proof presentation
pub fn verify_presentation(
presentation: &Presentation,
pres_req: &PresentationRequest,
schemas: &HashMap<&SchemaId, &Schema>,
cred_defs: &HashMap<&CredentialDefinitionId, &CredentialDefinition>,
rev_reg_defs: Option<&HashMap<&RevocationRegistryDefinitionId, &RevocationRegistryDefinition>>,
rev_status_lists: Option<Vec<&RevocationStatusList>>,
nonrevoke_interval_override: Option<
&HashMap<&RevocationRegistryDefinitionId, HashMap<u64, u64>>,
>,
) -> Result<bool> {
trace!("verify >>> presentation: {:?}, pres_req: {:?}, schemas: {:?}, cred_defs: {:?}, rev_reg_defs: {:?} rev_status_lists: {:?}",
presentation, pres_req, schemas, cred_defs, rev_reg_defs, rev_status_lists);
// These values are from the prover and cannot be trusted
let received_revealed_attrs: HashMap<String, Identifier> =
received_revealed_attrs(presentation)?;
let received_unrevealed_attrs: HashMap<String, Identifier> =
received_unrevealed_attrs(presentation)?;
let received_predicates: HashMap<String, Identifier> = received_predicates(presentation)?;
let received_self_attested_attrs: HashSet<String> = received_self_attested_attrs(presentation);
let pres_req = pres_req.value();
// Ensures that all attributes in the request is also in the presentation
compare_attr_from_proof_and_request(
pres_req,
&received_revealed_attrs,
&received_unrevealed_attrs,
&received_self_attested_attrs,
&received_predicates,
)?;
// Ensures the encoded values are same as request
verify_revealed_attribute_values(pres_req, presentation)?;
// Ensures the restrictinos set out in the request is met
verify_requested_restrictions(
pres_req,
schemas,
cred_defs,
&presentation.requested_proof,
&received_revealed_attrs,
&received_unrevealed_attrs,
&received_predicates,
&received_self_attested_attrs,
)?;
let mut proof_verifier = CryptoVerifier::new_proof_verifier()?;
let non_credential_schema = build_non_credential_schema()?;
for sub_proof_index in 0..presentation.identifiers.len() {
let identifier = presentation.identifiers[sub_proof_index].clone();
let schema = schemas
.get(&identifier.schema_id)
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Schema not provided for ID: {:?}", identifier.schema_id))?;
let cred_def_id = CredentialDefinitionId::new(identifier.cred_def_id.clone())?;
let cred_def = cred_defs.get(&cred_def_id).ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
"Credential Definition not provided for ID: {:?}",
identifier.cred_def_id
)
})?;
let rev_reg_map = if let Some(ref lists) = rev_status_lists {
let mut map: HashMap<
RevocationRegistryDefinitionId,
HashMap<u64, CryptoRevocationRegistry>,
> = HashMap::new();
for list in lists.iter() {
let id = list
.id()
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!(Unexpected, "RevStatusList missing Id"))?;
let timestamp = list
.timestamp()
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!(Unexpected, "RevStatusList missing timestamp"))?;
let rev_reg: Option<ursa::cl::RevocationRegistry> = (*list).try_into()?;
let rev_reg = rev_reg.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(Unexpected, "Revocation status list missing accumulator")
})?;
map.entry(id)
.or_insert_with(HashMap::new)
.insert(timestamp, rev_reg);
}
Some(map)
} else {
None
};
let (attrs_for_credential, attrs_nonrevoked_interval) =
get_revealed_attributes_for_credential(
sub_proof_index,
&presentation.requested_proof,
pres_req,
);
let (predicates_for_credential, pred_nonrevoked_interval) =
get_predicates_for_credential(sub_proof_index, &presentation.requested_proof, pres_req);
// Collaspe to the most stringent local interval for the attributes / predicates,
// we can do this because there is only 1 revocation status list for this credential
// if it satsifies the most stringent interval, it will satisfy all intervals
let mut cred_nonrevoked_interval: Option<NonRevokedInterval> =
match (attrs_nonrevoked_interval, pred_nonrevoked_interval) {
(Some(attr), None) => Some(attr),
(None, Some(pred)) => Some(pred),
(Some(mut attr), Some(pred)) => {
attr.compare_and_set(&pred);
Some(attr)
}
_ => None,
};
// Global interval is override by the local one,
// we only need to update if local is None and Global is Some,
// do not need to update if global is more stringent
if let (Some(global), None) = (
pres_req.non_revoked.clone(),
cred_nonrevoked_interval.as_mut(),
) {
cred_nonrevoked_interval = Some(global);
};
// Revocation checks is required iff both conditions are met:
// - Credential is revokable (input from verifier, trustable)
// - PresentationReq has asked for NRP* (input from verifier, trustable)
//
// * This is done by setting a NonRevokedInterval either for attr / predicate / global
let (rev_reg_def, rev_reg) = if let (Some(_), true) = (
cred_def.value.revocation.as_ref(),
cred_nonrevoked_interval.is_some(),
) {
let timestamp = identifier
.timestamp
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Identifier timestamp not found for revocation check"))?;
if rev_reg_defs.is_none() {
return Err(err_msg!(
"Timestamp provided but no Revocation Registry Definitions found"
));
}
if rev_reg_map.is_none() {
return Err(err_msg!(
"Timestamp provided but no Revocation Registries found"
));
}
let rev_reg_id = identifier
.rev_reg_id
.clone()
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Revocation Registry Id not found for revocation check"))?;
// Revocation registry definition id is the same as the rev reg id
let rev_reg_def_id = RevocationRegistryDefinitionId::new(rev_reg_id.clone())?;
// Override Interval if an earlier `from` value is accepted by the verifier
nonrevoke_interval_override.map(|maps| {
maps.get(&rev_reg_def_id).map(|map| {
cred_nonrevoked_interval
.as_mut()
.map(|int| int.update_with_override(map))
})
});
// Validate timestamp
cred_nonrevoked_interval
.map(|int| int.is_valid(timestamp))
.transpose()?;
let rev_reg_def = Some(
rev_reg_defs
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Could not load the Revocation Registry Definition"))?
.get(&rev_reg_def_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
"Revocation Registry Definition not provided for ID: {:?}",
rev_reg_def_id
)
})?,
);
let rev_reg = Some(
rev_reg_map
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Could not load the Revocation Registry mapping"))?
.get(&rev_reg_def_id)
.and_then(|regs| regs.get(×tamp))
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
"Revocation Registry not provided for ID and timestamp: {:?}, {:?}",
rev_reg_id,
timestamp
)
})?,
);
(rev_reg_def, rev_reg)
} else {
(None, None)
};
let credential_schema = build_credential_schema(&schema.attr_names.0)?;
let sub_pres_request =
build_sub_proof_request(&attrs_for_credential, &predicates_for_credential)?;
let credential_pub_key = CredentialPublicKey::build_from_parts(
&cred_def.value.primary,
cred_def.value.revocation.as_ref(),
)?;
let rev_key_pub = rev_reg_def.map(|d| &d.value.public_keys.accum_key);
proof_verifier.add_sub_proof_request(
&sub_pres_request,
&credential_schema,
&non_credential_schema,
&credential_pub_key,
rev_key_pub,
rev_reg,
)?;
}
let valid = proof_verifier.verify(&presentation.proof, pres_req.nonce.as_native())?;
trace!("verify <<< valid: {:?}", valid);
Ok(valid)
}
/// Generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random nonce with a length of 80 bits
pub fn generate_nonce() -> Result<Nonce> {
new_nonce()
}
fn compare_attr_from_proof_and_request(
pres_req: &PresentationRequestPayload,
received_revealed_attrs: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
received_unrevealed_attrs: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
received_self_attested_attrs: &HashSet<String>,
received_predicates: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
) -> Result<()> {
let requested_attrs: HashSet<String> = pres_req.requested_attributes.keys().cloned().collect();
let received_attrs: HashSet<String> = received_revealed_attrs
.iter()
.chain(received_unrevealed_attrs)
.map(|(r, _)| r.to_string())
.collect::<HashSet<String>>()
.union(received_self_attested_attrs)
.cloned()
.collect();
if requested_attrs != received_attrs {
return Err(err_msg!(
"Requested attributes {:?} do not correspond to received {:?}",
requested_attrs,
received_attrs
));
}
let requested_predicates: HashSet<&String> = pres_req.requested_predicates.keys().collect();
let received_predicates_: HashSet<&String> = received_predicates.keys().collect();
if requested_predicates != received_predicates_ {
return Err(err_msg!(
"Requested predicates {:?} do not correspond to received {:?}",
requested_predicates,
received_predicates
));
}
Ok(())
}
fn received_revealed_attrs(proof: &Presentation) -> Result<HashMap<String, Identifier>> {
let mut revealed_identifiers: HashMap<String, Identifier> = HashMap::new();
for (referent, info) in &proof.requested_proof.revealed_attrs {
revealed_identifiers.insert(
referent.to_string(),
get_proof_identifier(proof, info.sub_proof_index)?,
);
}
for (referent, infos) in &proof.requested_proof.revealed_attr_groups {
revealed_identifiers.insert(
referent.to_string(),
get_proof_identifier(proof, infos.sub_proof_index)?,
);
}
Ok(revealed_identifiers)
}
fn received_unrevealed_attrs(proof: &Presentation) -> Result<HashMap<String, Identifier>> {
let mut unrevealed_identifiers: HashMap<String, Identifier> = HashMap::new();
for (referent, info) in &proof.requested_proof.unrevealed_attrs {
unrevealed_identifiers.insert(
referent.to_string(),
get_proof_identifier(proof, info.sub_proof_index)?,
);
}
Ok(unrevealed_identifiers)
}
fn received_predicates(proof: &Presentation) -> Result<HashMap<String, Identifier>> {
let mut predicate_identifiers: HashMap<String, Identifier> = HashMap::new();
for (referent, info) in &proof.requested_proof.predicates {
predicate_identifiers.insert(
referent.to_string(),
get_proof_identifier(proof, info.sub_proof_index)?,
);
}
Ok(predicate_identifiers)
}
fn received_self_attested_attrs(proof: &Presentation) -> HashSet<String> {
proof
.requested_proof
.self_attested_attrs
.keys()
.cloned()
.collect()
}
fn get_proof_identifier(proof: &Presentation, index: u32) -> Result<Identifier> {
proof
.identifiers
.get(index as usize)
.cloned()
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Identifier not found for index: {}", index))
}
fn verify_revealed_attribute_values(
pres_req: &PresentationRequestPayload,
proof: &Presentation,
) -> Result<()> {
for (attr_referent, attr_info) in &proof.requested_proof.revealed_attrs {
let attr_name = pres_req
.requested_attributes
.get(attr_referent)
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"Attribute with referent \"{}\" not found in ProofRequests",
attr_referent
)
})?
.name
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"Attribute with referent \"{}\" not found in ProofRequests",
attr_referent,
)
})?;
verify_revealed_attribute_value(attr_name.as_str(), proof, attr_info)?;
}
for (attr_referent, attr_infos) in &proof.requested_proof.revealed_attr_groups {
let attr_names = pres_req
.requested_attributes
.get(attr_referent)
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"Attribute with referent \"{}\" not found in ProofRequests",
attr_referent,
)
})?
.names
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"Attribute with referent \"{}\" not found in ProofRequests",
attr_referent,
)
})?;
if attr_infos.values.len() != attr_names.len() {
error!("Proof Revealed Attr Group does not match Proof Request Attribute Group, proof request attrs: {:?}, referent: {:?}, attr_infos: {:?}", pres_req.requested_attributes, attr_referent, attr_infos);
return Err(err_msg!(
"Proof Revealed Attr Group does not match Proof Request Attribute Group",
));
}
for attr_name in attr_names {
let attr_info = &attr_infos.values.get(attr_name).ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!("Proof Revealed Attr Group does not match Proof Request Attribute Group",)
})?;
verify_revealed_attribute_value(
attr_name,
proof,
&RevealedAttributeInfo {
sub_proof_index: attr_infos.sub_proof_index,
raw: attr_info.raw.clone(),
encoded: attr_info.encoded.clone(),
},
)?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn verify_revealed_attribute_value(
attr_name: &str,
proof: &Presentation,
attr_info: &RevealedAttributeInfo,
) -> Result<()> {
let reveal_attr_encoded = attr_info.encoded.to_string();
let reveal_attr_encoded = Regex::new("^0*")
.unwrap()
.replace_all(&reveal_attr_encoded, "");
let sub_proof_index = attr_info.sub_proof_index as usize;
let crypto_proof_encoded = proof
.proof
.proofs
.get(sub_proof_index)
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"CryptoProof not found by index \"{}\"",
sub_proof_index,
)
})?
.revealed_attrs()?
.iter()
.find(|(key, _)| attr_common_view(attr_name) == attr_common_view(key))
.map(|(_, val)| val.to_string())
.ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"Attribute with name \"{}\" not found in CryptoProof",
attr_name,
)
})?;
if reveal_attr_encoded != crypto_proof_encoded {
return Err(err_msg!(ProofRejected,
"Encoded Values for \"{}\" are different in RequestedProof \"{}\" and CryptoProof \"{}\"", attr_name, reveal_attr_encoded, crypto_proof_encoded));
}
Ok(())
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
fn verify_requested_restrictions(
pres_req: &PresentationRequestPayload,
schemas: &HashMap<&SchemaId, &Schema>,
cred_defs: &HashMap<&CredentialDefinitionId, &CredentialDefinition>,
requested_proof: &RequestedProof,
received_revealed_attrs: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
received_unrevealed_attrs: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
received_predicates: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
self_attested_attrs: &HashSet<String>,
) -> Result<()> {
let proof_attr_identifiers: HashMap<String, Identifier> = received_revealed_attrs
.iter()
.chain(received_unrevealed_attrs)
.map(|(r, id)| (r.to_string(), id.clone()))
.collect();
let requested_attrs: HashMap<String, AttributeInfo> = pres_req
.requested_attributes
.iter()
.filter(|&(referent, info)| !is_self_attested(referent, info, self_attested_attrs))
.map(|(referent, info)| (referent.to_string(), info.clone()))
.collect();
let requested_attributes_queries = pres_req
.requested_attributes
.iter()
.filter_map(|(_, info)| info.restrictions.clone());
let requested_predicates_queries = pres_req
.requested_predicates
.iter()
.filter_map(|(_, info)| info.restrictions.clone());
let filter_tags: Vec<String> = requested_attributes_queries
.chain(requested_predicates_queries)
.flat_map(|r| {
r.get_name()
.iter()
.map(|n| n.to_owned().clone())
.collect::<Vec<String>>()
})
.collect();
// We check whether both the `issuer_id` and `issuer_did` are included. Since `issuer_did` will
// only be used for legacy support and `issuer_id` will be the new restriction tag, we do not
// allow mixing them.
if filter_tags.contains(&"issuer_id".to_owned())
&& filter_tags.contains(&"issuer_did".to_owned())
{
return Err(err_msg!("Presentation request contains restriction for `issuer_id` (new) and `issuer_did` (legacy)"));
}
// We check whether both the `schema_issuer_id` and `schema_issuer_did` are included. Since
// `schema_issuer_did` will only be used for legacy support and `schema_issuer_id` will be the
// new restriction tag, we do not allow mixing them.
if filter_tags.contains(&"schema_issuer_id".to_owned())
&& filter_tags.contains(&"schema_issuer_did".to_owned())
{
return Err(err_msg!("Presentation request contains both restrictions for `schema_issuer_id` (new) and `schema_issuer_did` (legacy)"));
}
for (referent, info) in &requested_attrs {
if let Some(ref query) = info.restrictions {
let filter = gather_filter_info(referent, &proof_attr_identifiers, schemas, cred_defs)?;
let attr_value_map: HashMap<String, Option<&str>> = if let Some(name) =
info.name.as_ref()
{
let mut map = HashMap::new();
map.insert(
name.clone(),
requested_proof
.revealed_attrs
.get(referent)
.map(|attr| attr.raw.as_str()),
);
map
} else if let Some(names) = info.names.as_ref() {
let mut map = HashMap::new();
let attrs = requested_proof
.revealed_attr_groups
.get(referent)
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("Proof does not have referent from proof request"))?;
for name in names {
let val = attrs.values.get(name).map(|attr| attr.raw.as_str());
map.insert(name.clone(), val);
}
map
} else {
error!(
r#"Proof Request attribute restriction should contain "name" or "names" param. Current proof request: {:?}"#,
pres_req
);
return Err(err_msg!(
r#"Proof Request attribute restriction should contain "name" or "names" param"#,
));
};
process_operator(&attr_value_map, query, &filter).map_err(err_map!(
"Requested restriction validation failed for \"{:?}\" attributes",
&attr_value_map
))?;
}
}
for (referent, info) in &pres_req.requested_predicates {
if let Some(ref query) = info.restrictions {
let filter = gather_filter_info(referent, received_predicates, schemas, cred_defs)?;
// start with the predicate requested attribute, which is un-revealed
let mut attr_value_map = HashMap::new();
attr_value_map.insert(info.name.to_string(), None);
// include any revealed attributes for the same credential (based on sub_proof_index)
let pred_sub_proof_index = requested_proof
.predicates
.get(referent)
.unwrap()
.sub_proof_index;
for attr_referent in requested_proof.revealed_attrs.keys() {
let attr_info = requested_proof.revealed_attrs.get(attr_referent).unwrap();
let attr_sub_proof_index = attr_info.sub_proof_index;
if pred_sub_proof_index == attr_sub_proof_index {
let attr_name = requested_attrs.get(attr_referent).unwrap().name.clone();
if let Some(name) = attr_name {
attr_value_map.insert(name, Some(attr_info.raw.as_str()));
}
}
}
for attr_referent in requested_proof.revealed_attr_groups.keys() {
let attr_info = requested_proof
.revealed_attr_groups
.get(attr_referent)
.unwrap();
let attr_sub_proof_index = attr_info.sub_proof_index;
if pred_sub_proof_index == attr_sub_proof_index {
for name in attr_info.values.keys() {
let raw_val = attr_info.values.get(name).unwrap().raw.as_str();
attr_value_map.insert(name.to_string(), Some(raw_val));
}
}
}
process_operator(&attr_value_map, query, &filter).map_err(err_map!(
"Requested restriction validation failed for \"{}\" predicate",
&info.name
))?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn is_self_attested(
referent: &str,
info: &AttributeInfo,
self_attested_attrs: &HashSet<String>,
) -> bool {
match info.restrictions.as_ref() {
Some(&Query::And(ref array) | &Query::Or(ref array)) if array.is_empty() => {
self_attested_attrs.contains(referent)
}
None => self_attested_attrs.contains(referent),
Some(_) => false,
}
}
fn gather_filter_info(
referent: &str,
identifiers: &HashMap<String, Identifier>,
schemas: &HashMap<&SchemaId, &Schema>,
cred_defs: &HashMap<&CredentialDefinitionId, &CredentialDefinition>,
) -> Result<Filter> {
let identifier = identifiers.get(referent).ok_or_else(|| {
err_msg!(
InvalidState,
"Identifier not found for referent: {}",
referent
)
})?;
let schema_id = &identifier.schema_id;
let cred_def_id = &identifier.cred_def_id;
let schema = schemas
.get(schema_id)
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("schema_id {schema_id} could not be found in the schemas"))?;
let cred_def = cred_defs
.get(cred_def_id)
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!("cred_def_id {cred_def_id} could not be found in the cred_defs"))?;
Ok(Filter {
schema_id: schema_id.clone(),
schema_name: schema.name.clone(),
schema_version: schema.version.clone(),
schema_issuer_id: schema.issuer_id.clone(),
issuer_id: cred_def.issuer_id.clone(),
cred_def_id: cred_def_id.clone(),
})
}
fn process_operator(
attr_value_map: &HashMap<String, Option<&str>>,
restriction_op: &Query,
filter: &Filter,
) -> Result<()> {
match restriction_op {
Query::Eq(ref tag_name, ref tag_value) => {
process_filter(attr_value_map, tag_name, tag_value, filter).map_err(err_map!(
"$eq operator validation failed for tag: \"{}\", value: \"{}\"",
tag_name,
tag_value
))
}
Query::Neq(ref tag_name, ref tag_value) => {
if process_filter(attr_value_map, tag_name, tag_value, filter).is_err() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(err_msg!(ProofRejected,
"$neq operator validation failed for tag: \"{}\", value: \"{}\". Condition was passed.", tag_name, tag_value))
}
}
Query::In(ref tag_name, ref tag_values) => {
let res = tag_values
.iter()
.any(|val| process_filter(attr_value_map, tag_name, val, filter).is_ok());
if res {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"$in operator validation failed for tag: \"{}\", values \"{:?}\".",
tag_name,
tag_values,
))
}
}
Query::And(ref operators) => operators
.iter()
.map(|op| process_operator(attr_value_map, op, filter))
.collect::<Result<Vec<()>>>()
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(err_map!("$and operator validation failed.")),
Query::Or(ref operators) => {
let res = operators
.iter()
.any(|op| process_operator(attr_value_map, op, filter).is_ok());
if res {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"$or operator validation failed. All conditions were failed.",
))
}
}
Query::Not(ref operator) => {
if process_operator(attr_value_map, operator, filter).is_err() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"$not operator validation failed. All conditions were passed.",
))
}
}
_ => Err(err_msg!(ProofRejected, "unsupported operator",)),
}
}
fn process_filter(
attr_value_map: &HashMap<String, Option<&str>>,
tag: &str,
tag_value: &str,
filter: &Filter,
) -> Result<()> {
trace!(
"_process_filter: attr_value_map: {:?}, tag: {}, tag_value: {}, filter: {:?}",
attr_value_map,
tag,
tag_value,
filter
);
match tag {
tag_ @ "schema_id" => precess_filed(tag_, filter.schema_id.to_string(), tag_value),
tag_ @ ("schema_issuer_did" | "schema_issuer_id") => {
precess_filed(tag_, filter.schema_issuer_id.clone(), tag_value)
}
tag_ @ "schema_name" => precess_filed(tag_, &filter.schema_name, tag_value),
tag_ @ "schema_version" => precess_filed(tag_, &filter.schema_version, tag_value),
tag_ @ "cred_def_id" => precess_filed(tag_, filter.cred_def_id.to_string(), tag_value),
tag_ @ ("issuer_did" | "issuer_id") => {
precess_filed(tag_, filter.issuer_id.clone(), tag_value)
}
key if is_attr_internal_tag(key, attr_value_map) => {
check_internal_tag_revealed_value(key, tag_value, attr_value_map)
}
key if is_attr_operator(key) => Ok(()),
_ => Err(err_msg!("Unknown Filter Type")),
}
}
fn precess_filed(filed: &str, filter_value: impl Into<String>, tag_value: &str) -> Result<()> {
let filter_value = filter_value.into();
// We explicitly check here with it is one of the two legacy identifier restrictions. This
// means that we only allow legacy identifiers which can be detected with a simple regex. If
// they are not in the legacy format, we do not support this.
if (filed == "schema_issuer_did" || filed == "issuer_did")
&& (LEGACY_DID_IDENTIFIER.captures(&filter_value).is_none())
{
return Err(err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"\"{}\" value is a legacy identifier tag and therefore only legacy identifiers can be used",
filed,
));
}
if filter_value == tag_value {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"\"{}\" values are different: expected: \"{}\", actual: \"{}\"",
filed,
tag_value,
filter_value,
))
}
}
fn is_attr_internal_tag(key: &str, attr_value_map: &HashMap<String, Option<&str>>) -> bool {
INTERNAL_TAG_MATCHER.captures(key).map_or(false, |caps| {
caps.get(1).map_or(false, |s| {
attr_value_map.contains_key(&s.as_str().to_string())
})
})
}
fn check_internal_tag_revealed_value(
key: &str,
tag_value: &str,
attr_value_map: &HashMap<String, Option<&str>>,
) -> Result<()> {
let attr_name = INTERNAL_TAG_MATCHER
.captures(key)
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!(InvalidState, "Attribute name became unparseable",))?
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| err_msg!(InvalidState, "No name has been parsed",))?
.as_str();
if let Some(Some(revealed_value)) = attr_value_map.get(attr_name) {
if *revealed_value != tag_value {
return Err(err_msg!(
ProofRejected,
"\"{}\" values are different: expected: \"{}\", actual: \"{}\"",
key,
tag_value,
revealed_value
));
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn is_attr_operator(key: &str) -> bool {
key.starts_with("attr::") && key.ends_with("::marker")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::data_types::rev_reg::RevocationRegistryId;
pub const SCHEMA_ID: &str = "123";
pub const SCHEMA_NAME: &str = "Schema Name";
pub const SCHEMA_ISSUER_ID: &str = "1111111111111111111111";
pub const SCHEMA_VERSION: &str = "1.2.3";
pub const CRED_DEF_ID: &str = "345";
pub const ISSUER_ID: &str = "1111111111111111111111";
fn schema_id_tag() -> String {
"schema_id".to_string()
}
fn schema_name_tag() -> String {
"schema_name".to_string()
}
fn schema_issuer_did_tag() -> String {
"schema_issuer_did".to_string()
}
fn schema_version_tag() -> String {
"schema_version".to_string()
}
fn cred_def_id_tag() -> String {
"cred_def_id".to_string()
}
fn issuer_did_tag() -> String {
"issuer_did".to_string()
}
fn attr_tag() -> String {
"attr::zip::marker".to_string()
}
fn attr_tag_value() -> String {
"attr::zip::value".to_string()
}
fn bad_attr_tag() -> String {
"bad::zip::marker".to_string()
}
fn filter() -> Filter {
Filter {
schema_id: SchemaId::new_unchecked(SCHEMA_ID),
schema_name: SCHEMA_NAME.to_string(),
schema_issuer_id: IssuerId::new_unchecked(SCHEMA_ISSUER_ID),
schema_version: SCHEMA_VERSION.to_string(),
cred_def_id: CredentialDefinitionId::new_unchecked(CRED_DEF_ID),
issuer_id: IssuerId::new_unchecked(ISSUER_ID),
}
}
fn _process_operator(
attr: &str,
restriction_op: &Query,
filter: &Filter,
revealed_value: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<()> {
let mut attr_value_map = HashMap::new();
attr_value_map.insert(attr.to_string(), revealed_value);
process_operator(&attr_value_map, restriction_op, filter)
}
#[test]
fn test_process_op_eq() {
let filter = filter();
let mut op = Query::Eq(schema_id_tag(), SCHEMA_ID.to_string());
_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).unwrap();
op = Query::And(vec![
Query::Eq(attr_tag(), "1".to_string()),
Query::Eq(schema_id_tag(), SCHEMA_ID.to_string()),
]);
_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).unwrap();
op = Query::And(vec![
Query::Eq(bad_attr_tag(), "1".to_string()),
Query::Eq(schema_id_tag(), SCHEMA_ID.to_string()),
]);
assert!(_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).is_err());
op = Query::Eq(schema_id_tag(), "NOT HERE".to_string());
assert!(_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_process_op_ne() {
let filter = filter();
let mut op = Query::Neq(schema_id_tag(), SCHEMA_ID.to_string());
assert!(_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).is_err());
op = Query::Neq(schema_id_tag(), "NOT HERE".to_string());
_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn test_process_op_in() {
let filter = filter();
let mut cred_def_ids = vec!["Not Here".to_string()];
let mut op = Query::In(cred_def_id_tag(), cred_def_ids.clone());
assert!(_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).is_err());
cred_def_ids.push(CRED_DEF_ID.to_string());
op = Query::In(cred_def_id_tag(), cred_def_ids.clone());
_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn test_process_op_or() {
let filter = filter();
let mut op = Query::Or(vec![
Query::Eq(schema_id_tag(), "Not Here".to_string()),
Query::Eq(cred_def_id_tag(), "Not Here".to_string()),
]);
assert!(_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).is_err());
op = Query::Or(vec![
Query::Eq(schema_id_tag(), SCHEMA_ID.to_string()),
Query::Eq(cred_def_id_tag(), "Not Here".to_string()),
]);
_process_operator("zip", &op, &filter, None).unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn test_process_op_and() {