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title: "Discovery of Network-designated CoRE Resolvers" abbrev: "CoRE DNR" category: info

docname: draft-lenders-core-dnr-00 submissiontype: IETF # also: "independent", "editorial", "IAB", or "IRTF" number: date: consensus: true v: 3 area: "Web and Internet Transport" workgroup: "Constrained RESTful Environments" keyword:

author:

  • fullname: Martine Sophie Lenders org: TUD Dresden University of Technology abbrev: TU Dresden street: Helmholtzstr. 10 city: Dresden code: D-01069 country: Germany email: [email protected]
  • name: Christian Amsüss email: [email protected]
  • fullname: Thomas C. Schmidt organization: HAW Hamburg email: [email protected]
  • name: Matthias Wählisch org: TUD Dresden University of Technology & Barkhausen Institut abbrev: TU Dresden & Barkhausen Institut street: Helmholtzstr. 10 city: Dresden code: D-01069 country: Germany email: [email protected]

normative: RFC7252: coap RFC7301: alpn RFC8613: oscore RFC9460: svcb RFC9461: svcb-for-dns RFC9462: ddr RFC9463: dnr I-D.ietf-core-dns-over-coap: doc I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc: edhoc

informative: RFC7228: constr-nodes RFC7858: dot RFC7959: coap-block RFC8323: coap-tcp RFC8484: doh RFC9250: doq RFC9203: ace-oscore I-D.amsuess-core-coap-over-gatt: coap-gatt I-D.ietf-ace-edhoc-oscore-profile: ace-edhoc I-D.ietf-core-href: cri lwm2m: title: White Paper – Lightweight M2M 1.1 author: org: OMA SpecWorks date: 2018-10 target: https://omaspecworks.org/white-paper-lightweight-m2m-1-1/

--- abstract

This document specifies solutions to discover DNS resolvers that support encrypted DNS resolution in constrained environments. The discovery is based DNS SVCB records, Router Advertisements, or DHCP. In particular, the proposed specification allows a host to learn DNS over CoAP (DoC) servers, including configurations to use DoC over TLS/DTLS, OSCORE, and EDHOC when resolving names.

--- middle

Introduction

{{-svcb-for-dns}}, {{-ddr}} and {{-dnr}} specify options to discover DNS resolvers that allow for encrypted DNS resolution, using either DNS or, in a local network, Router Advertisements or DHCP. These specifications use Service Binding (SVCB) resource records or Service Parameters (SvcParams) to carry information required for configuration of such resolvers. So far, however, only DNS transfer protocols based on Transport Layer Security (TLS) are supported, namely DNS over TLS (DoT) {{-dot}}, DNS over HTTPS (DoH) {{-doh}}, and DNS over Dedicated QUIC (DoQ) {{-doq}}. This document discusses and specifies options to discover DNS resolvers in constrained environments, mainly based on DNS over CoAP (DoC) {{-doc}}.

DoC provides a solution for encrypted DNS in constrained environments. In such scenarios, the usage of DoT, DoH, DoQ, or similar TLS-based solutions is often not possible. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) {{-coap}}, the transfer protocol for DoC, is mostly agnostic to the transport layer, i.e., CoAP can be transported over UDP, TCP, or WebSockets {{-coap-tcp}}, and even less common transports such as Bluetooth GATT {{-coap-gatt}} or SMS {{lwm2m}} are discussed.

CoAP offers three security modes, which would need to be covered by the SvcParams:

  • No Security: This plain CoAP mode does not support any encryption. It is not recommended when using {{-doc}} but inherits core CoAP features such as block-wise transfer {{-coap-block}} for datagram-based segmentation. Such features are beneficial in constrained settings even without encryption.

  • Transport Security: CoAP may use DTLS when transferred over UDP {{-coap}} and TLS when transferred over TCP {{-coap-tcp}}.

  • Object Security: Securing content objects can be achieved using OSCORE {{-oscore}}. OSCORE can be used either as an alternative or in addition to transport security.

    OSCORE keys have a limited lifetime and need to be set up, for example through an EDHOC key exchange {{-edhoc}}, which may use credentials from trusted ACE Authorization Server (AS) as described in the ACE EDHOC profile {{-ace-edhoc}}. As an alternative to EDHOC, keys can be set up by such an AS as described in the ACE OSCORE profile {{-ace-oscore}}.

To discover a DoC server via Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR) {{-ddr}} and Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR) {{-dnr}}, the SvcParams field needs to convey both transfer protocol and type and parameters of the security parameters. We will specify extensions of SvcParams in this document.

Terminology

The terms “DoC server” and “DoC client” are used as defined in {{-doc}}.

The terms “constrained node” and "constrained network" are used as defined in {{-constr-nodes}}.

SvcParams denotes the field in either DNS SVCB/HTTPS records as defined in {{-svcb}}, or DHCP and RA messages as defined in {{-dnr}}. SvcParamKeys are used as defined in {{-svcb}}.

{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged}

Problem Space

The first and most important question to ask for the discoverability of DoC resolvers is if and what new SvcParamKeys need to be defined.

{{-svcb}} defines the “alpn” key, which is used to identify the protocol suite of a service binding using its Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ID {{-alpn}}. While this is useful to identify classic transport layer security, the question is raised if this is needed or even helpful for when there is only object security. There is an ALPN ID for CoAP over TLS that was defined in {{-coap-tcp}}. As using the same ALPN ID for different transport layers is not recommended, an ALPN for CoAP over UDP is being requested in {{iana}}. Object security may be selected in addition to transport layer security, so defining an ALPN ID for each combination might not be viable or scalable. For some ways of setting up object security, additional information is needed for the establishment of an encryption context and for authentication with an authentication server (AS). Orthogonally to the security mechanism, the transfer protocol needs to be established.

Beyond the SvcParamKeys, there is the question of what the field values of the Encrypted DNS Options defined in {{-dnr}} might be with EDHOC or ACE EDHOC. While most fields map, “authentication-domain-name” (ADN) and its corresponding ADN length field may not matter in ACE driven cases.

Out of scope of this document are related issues adjacent to its problem space. they are listed both for conceptual delimitation, and to aid in discussion of more comprehensive solutions:

  • There is ongoing work in addressing the trouble created by CoAP using a diverse set of URI schemes in the shape of coap+..., such as coap+tcp {{?I-D.ietf-core-transport-indication}}. The creation of URI authority values that express the content of SVCB records together with IP literals is part of the solution space that will be explored there.

  • Route Advertisements (RAs) as used in {{-dnr}} can easily exceed the link layer fragmentation threshold of constrained networks. The presence of DNR information in an RA can contribute to that issue.

Solution Sketches

To answer the raised questions, we first look at the general case then 4 base scenarios, from which other scenarios might be a combination of:

  • Unencrypted DoC,
  • DoC over TLS/DTLS,
  • DoC over OSCORE using EDHOC, and
  • DoC over OSCORE using ACE-EDHOC.

In the general case, we mostly need to answer the question for additional SvcParamKeys. {{-svcb}} defines the keys “mandatory”, “alpn”, “no-default-alpn”, “port”, “ipv4hint”, and “ipv6hint” were defined. Additionally, {{-svcb-for-dns}} defines “dohpath” which carries the URI template for the DNS resource at the DoH server in relative form.

For DoC, the DNS resource needs to be identified as, so a corresponding “docpath” key should be provided that provides either a relative URI or CRI {{-cri}}. Since the URI-Path option in CoAP may be omitted (defaulting to the root path), this could also be done for the “docpath”.

Unencrypted DoC {#sec:solution-unencrypted}

While unencrypted DoC is not recommended by {{-doc}} and might not even be viable using DDR/DNR, it provides additional benefits not provided by classic unencrypted DNS over UDP, such as segmentation block-wise transfer {{-coap-block}}. However, it provides the simplest DoC configuration and thus is here discussed.

At minimum for a DoC server a way to identify the following keys are required. “docpath” (see above), an optional “port” (see {{-svcb}}), the IP address (either with an optional “ipv6hint”/“ipv4hint” or the respective IP address field in {{-dnr}}), and a yet to be defined SvcParamKey for the CoAP transfer protocol, e.g., “coaptransfer”. The latter can be used to identify the service binding as a CoAP service binding.

The “authenticator-domain-name” field should remain empty as it does not serve a purpose without encryption.

See this example for the possible values of a DNR option:

authenticator-domain-name: ""
ipv6-address: <DoC server address>
svc-params:
 - coaptransfer="tcp"
 - docpath="/dns"
 - port=61616

DoC over TLS/DTLS {#sec:solution-tls}

In addition to the SvcParamKeys proposed in {{sec:solution-unencrypted}}, this scenario needs the “alpn” key. While there is a “coap” ALPN ID defined, it only identifies CoAP over TLS {{-coap-tcp}}. As such, a new ALPN ID for CoAP over DTLS is required.

See this example for the possible values of a DNR option:

authenticator-domain-name: "dns.example.com"
ipv6-address: <DoC server address>
svc-params:
 - alpn="co"
 - docpath="/dns"

Note that “coaptransfer” is not needed, as it is implied by the ALPN ID; thus, no values for it would be allocated for transfer protocols that use transport security.

DoC over OSCORE using EDHOC

While the “alpn” SvcParamKey is needed for the transport layer security (see {{sec:solution-tls}}), we can implement a CA-style authentication with EDHOC when using object security with OSCORE using the authenticator-domain-name field.

A new key SvcParamKey “objectsecurity” identifies the type of object security, using the value "edhoc" in this scenario.

See this example for the possible values of a DNR option:

authenticator-domain-name: "dns.example.com"
ipv6-address: <DoC server address>
svc-params:
 - coaptransfer="udp",
 - objectsecurity="edhoc",
 - docpath="/dns",
 - port=61616

The use of objectsecurity="edhoc" with an authenticator-domain-name and no further ACE details indicates that the client can use CA based authentication of the server.

DoC over ACE-OSCORE

Using ACE, we require an OAuth context to authenticate the server in addition to the “objectsecurity” key. We propose three keys “oauth-aud” for the audience, “oauth-scope” for the OAuth scope, and “auth-as” for the authentication server. “oauth-aud” should be the valid domain name of the DoC server, “oauth-scope” a list of identifiers for the scope, and “oauth-as” a valid URI or CRI.

TBD: should oauth-scope be expressed at all?

Since authentication is done over OAuth and not CA-style, the “authenticator-domain-name” is not needed. There might be merit, however, to use it instead of the “oauth-aud” SvcParamKey.

See this example for the possible values of a DNR option:

authenticator-domain-name: ""
ipv6-address: <DoC server address>
svc-params:
 - coaptransfer="tcp"
 - objectsecurity="edhoc" /* TBD: or ace-edhoc? */
 - docpath="/dns",
 - port=61616,
 - oauth-aud="dns.example.com",
 - oauth-scope="resolve DNS"
 - oauth-as="coap://as.example.com"
~~~~~~~

# Security Considerations

TODO Security


# IANA Considerations {#iana}

## TLS ALPN for CoAP

The following entry is being requested for addition into the
"TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs" registry,
which is part of the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" group.

* Protocol: CoAP (over DTLS)
* Identification sequence: 0x63 0x6f ("co")
* Reference: {{-coap}} and \[this document\]

Note that {{-coap}} does not prescribe the use of the ALPN TLS extension during connection the DTLS handshake.
This document does not change that, and thus does not establish any rules like those in {{Section 8.2 of -coap-tcp}}.


--- back

# Acknowledgments
{:numbered="false"}

TODO acknowledge.